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A MODEL-THEORETIC CHARACTERIZATION OFMONADIC SECOND
ORDER LOGIC ON INFINITE WORDS
SILVIO GHILARDI AND SAMUEL J. VANGOOL
Abstract. Monadic second order logic and linear temporal logic are two logical formalisms that can be
used to describe classes of inﬁnite words, i.e., ﬁrst-order models based on the natural numbers with order,
successor, and ﬁnitely many unary predicate symbols.
Monadic second order logic over inﬁnite words (S1S) can alternatively be described as a ﬁrst-order
logic interpreted in P(), the power set Boolean algebra of the natural numbers, equipped with modal
operators for ‘initial’, ‘next’, and ‘future’ states. We prove that the ﬁrst-order theory of this structure is the
model companion of a class of algebras corresponding to a version of linear temporal logic (LTL) without
until.
The proof makes crucial use of two classical, nontrivial results from the literature, namely the com-
pleteness of LTL with respect to the natural numbers, and the correspondence between S1S-formulas and
Bu¨chi automata.
§1. Introduction. Monadic second order logic over the natural numbers with
successor operation is a rather expressive, but still decidable formalism. The decision
result, originally due to Bu¨chi [2], makes use of a conversion between logic and
automata. The key idea is to view interpretations of unary predicates over natural
numbers as inﬁnite words over a suitable alphabet: one can associate an automaton
with a formula, and vice versa, in such a way that, roughly speaking, the automaton
accepts exactly those inﬁnite words that, viewed as interpretations of second-order
variables, satisfy the formula. Converting a formula ϕ into an automaton Aϕ and
then the automaton Aϕ again into a formula, one does not get back the same
formula ϕ, but a formula ϕ′ which is equivalent to ϕ in the intended model of the
natural numbers. Loosely speaking, one may view ϕ′ as a kind of ‘normalization’
of ϕ. Morally, ϕ′ is an existential formula; although this is not formally true, the
‘existential nature’ of ϕ′ is rather evident. Nevertheless, in order to make ϕ′ into an
actual existential formula, an enlargement of the language is needed.
In this paper we make the above observations precise, which allows us to ﬁt
monadic second order logic into the framework of modern model-theoretic algebra
(Robinson’s legacy [14]), using the concepts of model completeness and model
companions. We brieﬂy recall these concepts now; precise deﬁnitions are given in
Section 2. Theories T ∗ with the property that every formula is equivalent modulo
T ∗ to an existential (equivalently: to a universal) formula are calledmodel complete;
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model complete theoriesT ∗ can also be characterized semantically by requiring that
all embeddings betweenmodels ofT ∗ are elementary. Algebraically closed ﬁelds and
real closed ﬁelds are classical examples of model complete theories (see, e.g., [16] for
many further examples). Moreover, as the previous paragraph indicates, monadic
second order logic, viewed as the ﬁrst-order theory of P(), is close to being model
complete; we will see later in this paper (Section 4) that it actually becomes model
complete in an enriched language. If T is the set of universal consequences of a
model complete theory T ∗, then T ∗ axiomatizes the class of structures which, as
models of T , are existentially closed: for the case of algebraically closed ﬁelds, T is
the theory of integral domains, for the case of real closed ﬁelds, T is the theory of
formally real ﬁelds, etc. In this situation, T ∗ is called a model companion of T .
In this paper, we exhibit a natural enrichment of the language of monadic second
order logic, viewed as the ﬁrst-order theory of P(), so that the theory becomes
model complete. Moreover, we axiomatize the underlying universal fragment,
i.e., the universal theory T of which monadic second order logic over natural
numbers is the model companion. Our idea is to use modal and temporal logic
to attain this goal. More precisely: we will use a variant of the modal logic LTL
(‘linear temporal logic’ [12]) with an actual instant of time (i.e., with an atom
for zero) and without until; i.e., we have a basic modal logic with a reachability
operator and one additional constant.1 We introduce a universal class of algebras
algebraizing this logic and we show that this class ﬁts our purposes. Indeed, this
class is axiomatized by a theoryT admitting amodel companionT ∗ which is exactly
monadic second order logic over the natural numbers (Theorem 2.2). In order to
establish this result, we shall make use, besides automata techniques, of standard
modal logic machinery, in particular, duality and ﬁltrations [3,9,10].
The paper is organized in the following way: in Section 2 we state our result, in
the (rather technical) Section 3 we give the part of the proof requiring modal logic
techniques (completeness of the axiomatization) and in Section 4 the part of the
proof requiring automata theory ingredients (model completeness of the theory in
the enriched language). Section 5 concludes and indicates directions for futurework.
§2. Definitions and statement of the main theorem. In the following deﬁnition,
we introduce the relevant class of algebras.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A (♦,X, I )-algebra is a tuple (A,∨,¬,⊥,♦,X, I ), where
(A,∨,¬,⊥) is a Boolean algebra, ♦ is a unary normal modal operator on A
(i.e., a (∨,⊥)-semilattice endomorphism of A), X is a Boolean endomorphism of
A, I is an element of A \ {⊥}, and, for any a ∈ A, the following conditions hold:
(i) ♦a = a ∨ X♦a,
(ii) if Xa ≤ a then ♦a ≤ a,
(iii) if a = ⊥ then I ≤ ♦a.
(iv) XI = ⊥.
The class of (♦,X, I )-algebras (which is a universal class) algebraizes a version
of linear temporal logic without the until connective and with a constant I for
1The reason for leaving out the Until operator is that we opted for as small a language as possible;
Until is not needed for our purpose of expressing the Bu¨chi acceptance condition. In fact, any operator
deﬁnable in monadic second order logic over the natural numbers could be added to our T (together
with its axiomatization) without aﬀecting our results.
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‘initial element’. The structure of (♦,X, I )-algebras will be studied in detail in
Section 3.
An important example of a (♦,X, I )-algebra is the power set algebra of the natural
numbers, P(), equipped with the usual Boolean operations, and the operations
♦S := {n ∈  | n ≤ s for some s ∈ S}, XS := {n ∈  | n + 1 ∈ S}, and I := {0}.
We will see in Section 4 that ﬁrst-order formulas in the signature of (♦,X, I )-
algebras, interpreted in P(), are interdeﬁnable with formulas in the system S1S,
monadic second order logic over the natural numbers with order and successor
relations.
If T and T ∗ are ﬁrst-order theories in the same signature, recall that T ∗ is called
a model companion of T if (i) the theories T and T ∗ have the same universal
consequences (i.e., T ∗ is a companion or co-theory of T ) and (ii) any ﬁrst-order
formula is equivalent over T ∗ to an existential formula (i.e., T ∗ is model complete).
The model companion of T is unique if it exists, and in this case it is the theory of
the existentially closed T -models [16].
Our main theorem is the following.
Theorem 2.2. The first-order theory of the (♦,X, I )-algebra P() is the model
companion of the first-order theory of (♦,X, I )-algebras.
In the rest of this paper,wedenote byT the ﬁrst-order theory of (♦,X, I )-algebras,
andbyT ∗ the ﬁrst-order theory of the (♦,X, I )-algebraP(). In Section 3,we prove
that T ∗ is a companion of T . In Section 4, we prove that T ∗ is model complete.
Together, these two sections prove Theorem 2.2.
§3. T ∗ is a companion of T . In this section, we prove that T ∗ is a companion of
T , i.e., that T and T ∗ have the same universal consequences.
Notation 3.1. Throughout this section, we denote by L = {∨,¬,⊥,♦,X, I } the
first-order signature of (♦,X, I )-algebras.We employ the usual abbreviations a∧b :=
¬(¬a ∨ ¬b), a := ¬♦¬a, a → b := ¬a ∨ b, and a ↔ b := (a → b) ∧ (b → a).
We begin with a useful observation: in the theoryT , we can reduce quantiﬁer-free
L-formulas to single equations.
Lemma 3.2. For any quantifier-free L-formula ϕ, there exists an L-term t such
that ϕ is equivalent to t = 
 in T .
Proof. Observe that, for any element w in a (♦,X, I )-algebra, we have
w = 
 if, and only if, I ≤ ♦¬w if, and only if, I → ♦¬w = 
. (*)
Let ϕ be a quantiﬁer-free formula. We may assume that ϕ is a disjunction of
formulas 1, . . . , n, where each j is a conjunction of literals, i.e., has the form
rj1 = sj1 and . . . and rjk = sjk and uj1 = vj1 and . . . and uj = vj ,
where the rji , s
j
i , u
j
i , v
j
i are L-terms. Deﬁne the L-terms
tj :=
k∧
i=1
(I → ♦¬(rji ↔ sji )) ∧
∧
i=1
(uji ↔ vji ), t := I →
n∨
j=1
tj .
Using (*) and basic facts about Boolean algebras, we obtain that j is equivalent
in T to tj = 
, so ϕ is equivalent in T to the disjunction (t1 = 
 or . . . or tn = 
).
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This disjunction, in turn, is equivalent in T to t = 
, as can be proved easily using
(*) again, together with the axioms 
 = 
 and I = ⊥. 
In order to prove that T ∗ is a companion of T , since T ⊆ T ∗, it suﬃces to prove
that any universal formula that is valid in P() is valid in any (♦,X, I )-algebra.
Therefore, by Lemma 3.2, it is enough to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. If t is anL-term andP() |= t = 
, then, for any (♦,X, I )-algebra
A, A |= t = 
.
In the rest of this section, we prove Theorem 3.3. The proof we give here is an
adaptation to our setting of the standard completeness theorem for LTLwith respect
to ; in particular, it is directly inspired by the proof given in [10, Chapter 9]. Our
proof of Theorem 3.3 is structured as follows. We will ﬁrst show, in Theorem 3.5,
that (♦,X, I )-algebras can be represented as dual algebras of (♦,X, I )-spaces
(Deﬁnition 3.4), by means of an adaptation of the standard (Stone-)Jo´nsson-Tarski
representation theorem. We then combine this theorem with an adaptation of a
ﬁltration argument for LTL (Lemma 3.9) to prove Theorem 3.3.
Below, we use the following notational conventions for a preorder (= set endowed
with a reﬂexive and transitive relation) (X,≤). We deﬁne x < y as (x ≤ y
and x = y); for Y ⊆ X , we write ↑Y := {x ∈ X | y ≤ x for some y ∈ Y},
and similarly ↓Y ; ﬁnally, for x ∈ X , we write ↑x and ↓x as shorthand for ↑{x} and
↓{x}, respectively.
We will now formulate the duality between algebras and general frames (viewed
as Stone spaces) that we need here. Our exposition will be brief, as we are only
using standard modal logic machinery. We refer to, e.g., [1, Chapter 5], for more
details on duality for modal algebras. To motivate the deﬁnition of (♦,X, I )-spaces,
observe that the ♦-reduct of a (♦,X, I )-algebra is an S4-algebra. Through Jo´nsson-
Tarski representation, S4-algebras correspond to Boolean spaces equipped with a
topological preorder, i.e., a preorder such that ↑x is closed for any point x and ↓K
is clopen for any clopen set K (see, e.g., [5, Remark 1 in Section 2.6]). The addi-
tional structure and properties of (♦,X, I )-algebras now correspond to additional
structure and properties of these preordered Boolean spaces, as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.4. We deﬁne a (♦,X, I )-space2 to be a tuple (X,≤, f, x0), where
X is a Boolean topological space, ≤ is a topological preorder on X , f : X → X
is a continuous function, x0 ∈ X is a point such that {x0} is clopen, and, for any
x, y ∈ X and clopen K ⊆ X :
(i) x ≤ f(x), and if x < y then f(x) ≤ y,
(ii) if f(K) ⊆ K then ↑K ⊆ K ,
(iii) x0 ≤ x,
(iv) f(x) = x0.
The dual algebra of a (♦,X, I )-space (X,≤, f, x0) is deﬁned to be the tuple
(A,♦,X, I ), where A is the Boolean algebra of clopen subsets of X , and for any
K ∈ A, ♦K := ↓K , XK := f−1(K), and I := {x0}.
2Note that our deﬁnition of (♦,X, I )-spaces makes crucial use of the second-order structure
(topology) on the underlying Kripke frames. This is necessarily so: the class of (♦,X, I )-algebras is
not canonical, so it can not be dual to an elementary class of Kripke frames, by a theorem of Fine [4].
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We now prove our representation theorem for (♦,X, I )-algebras.
Theorem 3.5. The class of (♦,X, I )-algebras coincides with the class of algebras
that are isomorphic to the dual algebra of a (♦,X, I )-space.
Proof. Note that, in any (♦,X, I )-algebra, I is an atom: let ⊥ < a ≤ I be arbi-
trary. Then I ≤ ♦a by Deﬁnition 2.1(iii). Also, ♦I ≤ I by Deﬁnition 2.1(ii) and
(iv). Using these facts, Deﬁnition 2.1(i) and themonotonicity ofX and♦, we obtain
that I ≤ a∨X♦a ≤ a∨X♦I ≤ a∨XI , i.e., I ≤ a byDeﬁnition 2.1(iv), as required.
Now, by the Jo´nsson-Tarski representation theorem (see, e.g., [1, Section 5.3]), the
class of algebras (A,♦,X, I ) where (A,♦) is an S4-algebra, X is an endomorphism,
and I is an atom of A, coincides with the class of algebras that are isomorphic to
the dual algebra of a tuple of the form (X,≤, f, x0), where X is a Boolean space,
≤ is a topological preorder on X , f is a continuous function on X , and x0 ∈ X is
such that {x0} is clopen.
It remains to prove that (X,f,≤, x0) validates (i)–(iv) in the deﬁnition of
(♦,X, I )-space if, and only if, its dual algebra A is a (♦,X, I )-algebra. This follows
from the following claim.
Claim 1. The following equivalences hold.
(a) x ≤ f(x) for all x ∈ X ⇐⇒ X♦a ≤ ♦a for all a ∈ A.
(b) if x < y then f(x) ≤ y for all x, y ∈ X ⇐⇒ ♦a ≤ a ∨X♦a for all a ∈ A.
(c) (X,f,≤) validates (ii) in Definition 3.4 ⇐⇒ A validates (ii) in Definiton 2.1.
(d) x0 ≤ x for all x ∈ X ⇐⇒ I ≤ ♦a for all a ∈ A \ {⊥}.
(e) f(x) = x0 for all x ∈ X ⇐⇒ XI = ⊥.
Proof of Claim. (a) (⇒) Let a ∈ A be arbitrary, and suppose that x ∈ X♦a.
Then f(x) ∈ ♦a, and x ≤ f(x), so x ∈ ♦a.
(⇐) Suppose that x  f(x) for some x ∈ X . Since ↑x is closed, there exists a
clopen set a ∈ A such that f(x) ∈ a and ↑x ∩ a = ∅. In particular, f(x) ∈ ♦a, so
x ∈ X♦a, but x ∈ ♦a.
(b) (⇒) Let a ∈ A be arbitrary, and suppose that x ∈ ♦a but x ∈ a. Since
x ∈ ♦a, pick y ≥ x such that y ∈ a. Since x ∈ a, we have x = y, so f(x) ≤ y.
Hence, x ∈ X♦a.
(⇐) Suppose that there exist x, y ∈ X such that x < y, but f(x)  y. Since ↑f(x)
is closed, pick a1 ∈ A such that y ∈ a1 and ↑f(x) ∩ a1 = ∅. Since x = y, pick
a2 ∈ A such that y ∈ a2 and x ∈ a2. Let a := a1∩a2. Note thatx ∈ ♦a, since x ≤ y
and y ∈ a. However, we have x ∈ a, and x ∈ X♦a, contrary to the assumption
that ♦a ≤ a ∨ X♦a for all a ∈ A.
(c) Note that f(K) ⊆ K if, and only if, f−1(Kc) ⊆ Kc , and that ↑K ⊆ K if,
and only if, ↓(Kc) ⊆ Kc . The stated equivalence now follows from the deﬁnitions
of X and ♦.
(d) (⇒) If a ∈ A \ {⊥}, then there is x ∈ a. Since x0 ≤ x, it follows that
I = {x0} ≤ ♦a.
(⇐) If x0  x, pick a ∈ A such that x ∈ a and ↑x0 ∩ a = ∅. Then a = ⊥, but
x0 ∈ ♦a, so I  ♦a.
(e) Clear from the deﬁnitions. 
We may use the representation theorem, Theorem 3.5, to prove the following
proposition, which will be used in the proof of Lemma 3.9.
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Proposition 3.6. Any (♦,X, I )-algebra validates the equations
(Con) (a → b) ∨(b → a) = 
,
(Dum) ((a → a)→ a) ∧ ♦a ≤ a.
Moreover, the preorder on any (♦,X, I )-space is linear.
Proof. Let A be a (♦,X, I )-algebra dual to a (♦,X, I )-space (X,≤, f, x0).
(Con). Let a, b ∈ A be arbitrary, and write K := ♦¬(a → b) ∧ ♦¬(b → a),
the complement of (a → b) ∨ (b → a). We need to show that K = ∅. We
prove ﬁrst that f(K) ⊆ K . If x ∈ K , pick y ∈ ¬(a → b) = a ∧ ¬b and
z ∈ ¬(b → a) = b ∧ ¬a with y, z ≥ x. Then y = x, since y ∈ a but z ∈ a,
while x ≤ z. Sof(x) ≤ y. Similarly, f(x) ≤ z, so f(x) ∈ K . By Deﬁnition 3.4(ii),
we obtain that ↑K ⊆ K . Now, if we would also have that K = ∅, then there would
exist x ∈ K and y ≥ x such that y ∈ a∧¬b. But then y ∈ (b → a), so y ∈ K ,
contradicting that ↑K ⊆ K . Therefore, we must haveK = ∅, as required.
(Dum). Let a ∈ A be arbitrary.We will prove((a → a)→ a)∧♦a ≤ a,
from which (Dum) follows since a ≤ a. The method is the same as before. Let
us write K := ((a → a) → a) ∧ ♦a ∧ ¬a. We need to show that K = ∅.
We prove ﬁrst that f(K) ⊆ K . Let x ∈ K be arbitrary. Pick y ≥ x such that
y ∈ a, and pick z ≥ x such that z ∈ a. Then z = x, so f(x) ≤ z, and
f(x) ∈ ♦a. Also, since ↑(b) ⊆ b holds for any b, and x ≤ f(x), we have
f(x) ∈ ((a → a) → a). It remains to prove that f(x) ∈ ¬a. If y = x,
then f(x) ≤ y, and we are done. Otherwise, we have that y = x, so x ∈ a. Since
x ∈ (a → a) → a, pick w ≥ x such that w ∈ a and w ∈ ¬a. Then w = x,
so f(x) ≤ w, so f(x) ∈ ¬a, as required. Again, by Deﬁnition 3.4(ii), we obtain
↑K ⊆ K , and if K were nonempty, we would have x ∈ K and z ≥ x such that
z ∈ a, but then z ∈ K , contradiction. So K = ∅, as required.
Finally, since (Con) holds in A, the preorder≤ is connected, i.e., for any z, x, y ∈
X , if z ≤ x and z ≤ y, then x ≤ y or y ≤ x (see, e.g., [1, Exercise 4.3.3]). Since the
(♦,X, I )-space (X,≤, f, x0) has a minimum element, x0, it follows that the preorder
is linear. 
We now turn to the ﬁltration argument. The following syntactic lemma, which
allows us to rewrite terms into negation normal form, will be useful. We call an
L-term a literal if it is either a variable, a constant (⊥ or I ), a negated variable or a
negated constant. An L-term is in negation normal form (NNF) if it is built up from
literals by repeated applications of ∨, ∧, ♦, , and X.
Lemma 3.7. For any L-term t, there exists an L-term t′ in negative normal form
such that T  t = t′.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of theL-term t, we can push any negation
inwards, making use of the following T -provable equalities: ¬(s1 ∨ s2) = ¬s1 ∧¬s2,
¬(s1 ∧ s2) = ¬s1 ∨ ¬s2, ¬♦s = ¬s , ¬s = ♦¬s , and ¬Xs = X¬s . 
Deﬁnition 3.8. A ﬁnite set Γ of NNF L-terms is filterable if
(i) Γ contains I ,
(ii) Γ is closed under subterms,
(iii) whenever Γ contains ♦s for some term s , Γ also contains X♦s ,
(iv) whenever Γ contains s for some term s , Γ also contains Xs .
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Lemma 3.9. Let Γ be a filterable set, and denote by v1, . . . , vN the variables
occurring in Γ. For any (♦,X, I )-space (X,f,≤X , x0) with dual algebra A and a ∈
AN , there exists p ∈ P()N with the following property: for any x ∈ X , there is
nx ∈  such that for all s ∈ Γ,
if x ∈ sA(a) then nx ∈ sP()(p). ()
Proof. Let (X,f,≤X , x0) be a (♦,X, I )-space and let a ∈ AN . Throughout this
proof, if x ∈ X and s is a term, we will write “x ∈ s” as shorthand for “x ∈ sA(a)”.
Let ∼ be the equivalence relation on X deﬁned by
x ∼ x′ ⇐⇒ for all s ∈ Γ : x ∈ s if, and only if x′ ∈ s.
Since Γ is ﬁnite, X/∼ is ﬁnite. We write Y := X/∼ and q : X  Y for the
quotient map. Note that q is continuous with respect to the discrete topology on
Y , since each equivalence class [x]∼ is clopen: it can be described by the formula∧
x∈∈Γ  ∧
∧
x ∈∈Γ ¬.
We will deﬁne three relations, F , ≤Y , and, on the quotient Y . First, deﬁne the
relation F by:
y F y′ ⇐⇒ there exists x ∈ X such that q(x) = y and q(f(x)) = y′,
that is, F is the smallest ﬁltration of the (functional) relation f on X , cf., e.g.,
[1, Lemma 2.40]. Let ≤Y be the reﬂexive and transitive closure of F , i.e.,
y ≤Y y′ ⇐⇒ there exist m ≥ 0 and z0, . . . , zm ∈ Y such that
z0 = y, zm = y′, and zi F zi+1 for all 0 ≤ i < m.
Finally, we deﬁne a relation  on Y by
y  y′ ⇐⇒ for all x ∈ X, if q(x) = y, then there exists
x′ ∈ X such that x ≤ x′ and q(x) = y′.
In the following claim, we collect several properties of the three relations deﬁned
above. In particular, (i) & (ii) show that F is a ﬁltration of f, (iii) & (iv) show
that ≤Y is a ﬁltration of ≤X , (v)–(viii) provide detailed properties of the relation
 that we need in our construction, and (ix) & (x) show that the properties of the
minimum element x0 are preserved in (Y,).
Claim 1. For any x, x′ ∈ X , y, y′ ∈ Y , the following hold.
(i) q(x) F q(f(x)).
(ii) whenever Xt ∈ Γ, if q(x) F q(x′) then x ∈ Xt if, and only if, x′ ∈ t.
(iii) if x ≤X x′, then q(x) ≤Y q(x′).
(iv) whenever t ∈ Γ, if q(x) ≤Y q(x′) and x ∈ t, then x′ ∈ t.
(v)  is a linear preorder.
(vi) if y  y′, then y ≤Y y′.
(vii) whenever ♦t ∈ Γ, if x ∈ ♦t then there exists w such that q(x)  q(w) and
w ∈ t.
(viii) if y  y′ and y′  y, then either y = y′, or z  y for all z ∈ Y .
(ix) q(x) = q(x0) if, and only if, x = x0.
(x) q(x0)  y and not y F q(x0).
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Proof of Claim 1. (i) and (ii) are standard, cf. e.g., [1, Lemma 2.40].
(iii) Note that it suﬃces to prove thatKy := {x′ ∈ X | y ≤Y q(x′)} is an up-set in
≤X for any y ∈ Y . Notice thatKy is clopen, since q is continuous andY is ﬁnite. To
show thatKy is an up-set, byDeﬁnition 3.4(ii), it suﬃces to prove thatf(Ky) ⊆ Ky .
Indeed, if x′ ∈ Ky , then y ≤Y q(x′) F q(f(x′)), and ≤Y is a transitive relation
containing F , so q(f(x′)) ∈ Ky .
(iv) Suppose that t ∈ Γ and x ∈ t. By induction on m, using that Xt ∈ Γ
since Γ is ﬁlterable, one can prove that if there exists an F -path of length m from
q(x) to q(x′), then x′ ∈ t. Now, if q(x) ≤Y q(x′), then by deﬁnition of ≤Y there
exists an F -path from q(x) to q(x′), so x′ ∈ t. In particular, x′ ∈ t.
(v) Reﬂexivity and transitivity are straight-forward to prove. For linearity,
suppose that y  y′. Pick x ∈ X such that q(x) = y and for any x′ such that
q(x′) = y′, we have x X x′. Since≤X is linear (Proposition 3.6), we have x′ ≤X x
for any x′ such that q(x′) = y′, so y′  y.
(vi) Suppose that y  y′. Pick x ∈ X such that q(x) = y. By deﬁnition of ,
pick x′ ≥X x such that q(x′) = y′. By (iii), we have y = q(x) ≤Y q(x′) = y′.
(vii) Suppose that ♦t ∈ Γ and x ∈ ♦t. Let T := {y ∈ Y | q(x)  y}. For each
y ∈ T , we have q(x)  y, so pick xy ∈ X such that q(xy) = q(x) and, for any w
such that q(w) = y, we have xy  w. Since ≤X is linear (Proposition 3.6), choose
an enumeration y0, . . . , ym of the elements of T such that xy0 ≤X · · · ≤X xym . Since
x ∈ ♦t ∈ Γ and xym ∼ x, we have xym ∈ ♦t. Pick w ≥X xym such that w ∈ t.
Note that q(w) ∈ T : otherwise, we would have q(w) = yj for some yj ∈ T , and
xyj ≤X xym ≤X w, contradicting the choice of xyj . Therefore, since  is linear by
(v), we must have q(x)  q(w), as required.
(viii) Suppose that y  y′, y = y′ and that there exists z ∈ Y such that z  y.
We prove that y′  y. Let a := {v ∈ X | q(v) = y}, a clopen subset of X since
q is continuous. Pick an element x ∈ X such that q(x) = y, i.e., x ∈ a. We note
ﬁrst that x ∈ ♦a: since z  y, pick w ∈ X such that q(w) = z and, whenever
w ≤X v, q(v) = y. Now w ∈ a, so w ≤X x, and hence x ≤X w since ≤X is
linear. Now, since A veriﬁes (Dum) (Proposition 3.6), x ∈ a, and x ∈ ♦a, we
obtain x ∈ ((a → a) → a). Pick x1 ≥X x such that x1 ∈ (a → a) and
x1 ∈ a. By deﬁnition of a, we have q(x1) = y  y′, so we may pick x2 ≥X x1
such that q(x2) = y′. Since y = y′, we have x2 ∈ a. Thus, since x1 ∈ (a → a),
and x1 ≤X x2, we obtain x2 ∈ a. In particular, there is no v ≥X x2 such that
q(v) = y, so y′  y, as required.
(ix) If q(x) = q(x0), then since x0 ∈ I and I ∈ Γ, we have x ∈ I . Therefore,
x = x0.
(x) By (ix) and the fact that x0 ≤X x for any x ∈ X , it is clear that q(x0)  y
for any y ∈ Y . If we would have y F q(x0), then there would exist x ∈ X such
that q(x) = y and q(f(x)) = q(x0). However, by (ix) we would get f(x) = x0,
contradicting Deﬁnition 3.4(iv). 
We will write≡ for the equivalence relation induced by, i.e., y ≡ y′ if, and only
if, y  y′ and y′  y. By Claim 1(viii), the preorder (Y,) is a “balloon”, i.e., there
exist α ≥ 0, 	 ≥ 1 and an enumeration y0, . . . , yα, . . . , yα+	−1 of the elements of Y
such that, for 0 ≤ i ≤ α − 1, yi  yi+1, and yi+1  yi , and for 0 ≤ j, j′ ≤ 	 − 1,
yα+j ≡ yα+j′ . In a picture:
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y0

y1

y2
 . . . 
yα−1

yα
≡ . . . ≡
yα+	−1
As a convenient notation, we extend this enumeration of the elements of Y to an
inﬁnite sequence, by deﬁning yα+ := yα+( mod 	) for any  ≥ 	 .
We now deﬁne a function 
 :  → Y and a strictly increasing sequence of natural
numbers (i)i∈ with the following properties:
(i) 
(n) F 
(n + 1) for all n,
(ii) 
(i) = yi for all i .
Let 
(0) := y0 and 0 := 0. Assume that i and 
(n) have been deﬁned correctly
for all n ≤ i . Since yi  yi+1, by Claim 1(vi), we have yi ≤Y yi+1, so we may pick
m > 0,
(i+1), . . . , 
(i+m) ∈ Y with
(i+m) = yi+1 and
(i+j)F 
(i+j+1)
for all 0 ≤ j < m. Deﬁne i+1 := i + m. Note that we may indeed arrange the
choice so that m > 0: if yi = yi+1, this is automatic, and if yi = yi+1 then 	 = 1
and i ≥ α; in this case ﬁrst choose any 
(i + 1) ∈ Y so that yi F 
(i + 1),
and then choose an F -path from 
(i + 1) to yi = yi+1, which can be done since

(i + 1)  yi so 
(i + 1) ≤Y yi by Claim 1(vi).
Finally, we deﬁne the valuation p ∈ P()N by setting, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ N ,
pj := {n ∈  | 
(n) = q(x) for some x ∈ aj}.
The fact that () in the statement of Lemma 3.9 is true for this choice of p will
follow from the following claim and the fact that 
 is surjective, by property (ii)
of 
.
Claim 2. For any s ∈ Γ,
for any x ∈ X, n ∈ , if q(x) = 
(n) and x ∈ sA(a), then n ∈ sP()(p). (Ps )
Proof of Claim 2. By induction on s , which is in negation normal form by
assumption.
(s = vj). If q(x) = 
(n) and x ∈ aj then n ∈ pj by deﬁnition.
(s = ¬vj). If q(x) = 
(n) and x ∈ ¬vj , then x ∈ aj . Since vj ∈ Γ, for any x′
with 
(n) = q(x′), we have x′ ∼ x, so x′ ∈ aj . Hence, n ∈ pj , so n ∈ ¬pj .
(s = I ). If q(x) = 
(n) and x ∈ I then x = x0. Then 
(n) = q(x0) = y0, since
q(x0)  q(x) for all x by Claim 1(x). If we would have n > 0, then we would get

(n − 1)Fy0, which is impossible by Claim 1(x). So n = 0 ∈ I .
(s = ¬I ). If q(x) = 
(n) and x ∈ ¬I then x = x0. By Claim 1(ix), q(x) = y0.
Thus, 
(n) = y0, so in particular n = 0, so n ∈ ¬I .
(s = s1 ∨ s2) and (s = s1 ∧ s2) are straight-forward.
(s = Xt). Suppose that q(x) = 
(n) and x ∈ Xt. Since 
(n) F 
(n + 1), pick x′
such that q(x′) = 
(n) = q(x) and q(f(x′)) = 
(n + 1). Since x ∈ Xt, Xt ∈ Γ,
and q(x) = q(x′), we have x′ ∈ Xt, so f(x′) ∈ t. By the induction hypothesis (Pt),
we get n + 1 ∈ t, so n ∈ Xt = s .
(s = t). Suppose that q(x) = 
(n) and x ∈ t. Let m ≥ n be arbitrary, and
pick x′ such that q(x′) = 
(m). It follows from property (i) of 
 that q(x) =

(n) ≤Y 
(m) = q(x′). By Claim 1(iv), we have x′ ∈ t. Applying the induction
hypothesis (Pt) to x′ and m, we obtain m ∈ t. Since m was arbitrary, we conclude
that n ∈ t.
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(s = ♦t). Suppose that q(x) = 
(n) and x ∈ ♦t. We need to prove that
n ∈ ♦t, i.e., that there exists k ≥ 0 such that n + k ∈ t. We ﬁrst prove that,
for any k, if n + i ∈ t for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, then q−1(
(n + k)) ⊆ ♦t. For
k = 0, this is clear, because x ∈ ♦t ∈ Γ. For the induction step, if the state-
ment holds for some k, assume that q(x′) = 
(n + k + 1) and n + i ∈ t for
all 0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1. Pick some x′′ such that q(x′′) = 
(n + k). Then x′′ ∈ ♦t
by the statement for k, and x′′ ∈ t, for otherwise (Pt) would give n + k ∈ t.
Therefore, by Deﬁnition 2.1(i), x′′ ∈ X♦t, and X♦t ∈ Γ since Γ is ﬁlterable. By
Claim 1(ii) and the fact that q(x′′) = 
(n + k) F 
(n + k + 1) = q(x′), we obtain
x′ ∈ ♦t.
Now, since 
 visits yα inﬁnitely often, pick  ≥ 0 such that 
(n + ) = yα .
If n+ i ∈ t for some 0 ≤ i ≤  , then we are done. Otherwise, pick some u ∈ X such
that q(u) = yα ; by the previous paragraph, u ∈ ♦t. By Claim 1(vii), pick w ∈ X
such that yα  q(w) and w ∈ t. Then q(w) = yα+j for some 0 ≤ j ≤ 	 − 1. Since

 visits yα+j inﬁnitely often, pick k ≥  such that 
(n + k) = yα+j = q(w). Then
n + k ∈ t by (Pt). 
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 3.3, which, by the remarks preceding
it, ﬁnishes the proof that T ∗ is a companion of T .
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let t(v1, . . . , vN ) be any L-term, and assume that
P() |= t = 
. By Lemma 3.7, let u be an NNF L-term that is equivalent to
¬t. Let Sub(u) denote the set of subterms of the term u, and let Γ be the ﬁlterable
set
Γ := {s | s ∈ Sub(u)} ∪ {X♦s | ♦s ∈ Sub(u)} ∪ {Xs | s ∈ Sub(u)} ∪ {I }.
Indeed, Γ is ﬁnite, and any element of Γ is in negation normal form.
Let A be a (♦,X, I )-algebra and let a ∈ AN be arbitrary; we prove that tA(a) =

A. By Theorem 3.5, there exists a (♦,X, I )-space (X,≤, f, x0) with dual algebra
(isomorphic to) A. Choose p ∈ P()n with property () of Lemma 3.9. Let x ∈ X
be arbitrary. Pick nx ∈  as in Lemma 3.9. Then nx ∈ tP()(p), since P() |= t =

, so nx ∈ (¬t)P()(p) = uP()(p). Hence, since u ∈ Γ, we also have x ∈ uA(a) =
(¬t)A(a), by the property () in Lemma 3.9. Therefore, x ∈ tA(A). Since x was
arbitrary, it follows that tA(a) = X = 
A. 
§4. T ∗ is model complete. Let ϕ be a ﬁrst-order formula in the signature of
(♦,X, I )-algebras. We need to show that ϕ is equivalent to an existential formula
ϕ′ in T ∗, the ﬁrst-order theory of P(). We will proceed according to the following
scheme.
(i) Syntactically transform ϕ into a formula ϕ̂ of the monadic second-order
logic S1S (Proposition 4.3).
(ii) Associate to the S1S-formula ϕ̂ a Bu¨chi automatonAϕ̂ (Theorem 4.6).
(iii) Associate to the Bu¨chi automaton Aϕ̂ a (♦,X, I )-term tAϕ̂ representing it
(Proposition 4.8).
(iv) Use an appropriate renaming of variables to obtain an existential formula
ϕ′ equivalent to ϕ (Section 4.4).
We now perform each of the steps in Sections 4.1–4.4 below.
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4.1. Fromfirst-order to S1S. Let us recall a deﬁnition of the syntax and semantics
of the monadic second-order logic S1S (see, e.g., [11, Chapter 12] for more details
and background).
Deﬁnition 4.1. The set S1S(V) of S1S-formulae with free variables contained
in a set V is the smallest set such that:
(i) for each P,Q ∈ V , the formulae P ⊆ Q and S(P,Q) are in S1S(V),
(ii) if ϕ and  are in S1S(V), then ϕ ∨  and ¬ϕ are in S1S(V),
(iii) if ϕ is in S1S(V) and R is in V then ∃Rϕ is in S1S(V \ {R}).
The satisfaction relation |= ⊆ P()V × S1S(V) is deﬁned inductively by
(i) v |= P ⊆ Q if, and only if, v(P) ⊆ v(Q),
v |= S(P,Q) if, and only if, there exists n ∈ P such that n + 1 ∈ Q,
(ii) v |= ϕ ∨  if, and only if, v |= ϕ or v |= ,
v |= ¬ϕ if, and only if, v |= ϕ does not hold,
(iii) v |= ∃Rϕ if, and only if, there exists a variant v′ of v, diﬀering from v only
for the value of R, such that v′ |= ϕ.
Recall [11, Deﬁnition 12.5] that a quantiﬁcation over an individual variable,
∃xϕ, can be encoded in S1S as a quantiﬁcation ∃x(sing(x) ∧ ϕ), where sing(x) is
an S1S-formula expressing that v(x) must be a singleton for any valuation v. We
use the convention that lowercase letters x, y, . . . are individual variables, while
capital letters P, Q, R, . . . are set variables. We will also make use of the standard
abbreviations x ∈ P, P = Q, x ≤ y, S(x, y), as in [11, Chapter 12].
Notation 4.2. In order to avoid confusion, we need to distinguish the function
symbols ∨, ¬, ⊥ in the first-order signature L of (♦,X, I )-algebras from the symbols
∨, ¬, ⊥ that occur as connectives in first-order L-formulae and in S1S-formulae.
Therefore, throughout this section, we use an alternative first-order signature L∗ :=
{∪,−, ∅,♦,X, I } for (♦,X, I )-algebras, as well as abbreviations a∩b := −(−a∪−b)
and a ⇒ b := −a ∪ b.
We now come to the translation from ﬁrst-order L∗-formulas to formulas in the
logic S1S. This translation is a variant of the so-called standard translation of modal
logic into monadic second-order logic, cf., e.g., [1, Proposition 3.12].
Proposition 4.3. For any first-order L∗-formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pn), there exists an
S1S-formula ϕ̂(P1, . . . , Pn) such that, for any v ∈ P()n ,3
P(), v |= ϕ if, and only if, v |= ϕ̂. (1)
Proof. Weﬁrst inductively deﬁne, for anyL∗-term t(p1, . . . , pn), an S1S-formula
t•(P1, . . . , Pn, x), where x is a fresh individual variable, as follows:
• (pi)• := x ∈ Pi ,
• (t ∪ u)• := t•(x) ∨ u•(x),
• (−t)• := ¬(t•)(x),
3Note that the symbol |= is used with two diﬀerent meanings in (1): on the left-hand-side, it denotes
the usual satisfaction relation of ﬁrst-order logic, while on the right-hand-side it denotes the satisfaction
relation of S1S of Deﬁnition 4.1. Similarly, the tuple v ∈ P()n is regarded on the left as a valuation
of the ﬁrst-order variables p1, . . . , pn , and on the right as a valuation of the second-order variables
P1, . . . , Pn .
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• ∅• := ¬(x = x),
• (♦t)• := ∃y(x ≤ y ∧ t•(P1, . . . , Pn, y)),
• (Xt)• := ∃y(S(x, y) ∧ t•(P1, . . . , Pn, y)),
• I • := ∀z(x ≤ z).
Note that, for any i ∈  and v ∈ P()n, we have
i ∈ tP()(v(1), . . . , v(n)) if, and only if, v |= t•(v(1), . . . , v(n), i). (2)
Now, for any L∗-formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pn), deﬁne ϕ̂(P1, . . . , Pn) by replacing any
atomic formula t = u by ∀x(t•(P1, . . . , Pn, x) ↔ u•(P1, . . . , Pn, x)), and any
occurrence of ∃p by ∃P. The claimed equivalence is proved by an easy induction on
the complexity of ϕ, using (2) for the base case. 
4.2. From S1S-formula to Bu¨chi automaton. We brieﬂy recall the deﬁnition of
ﬁnite automata and the Bu¨chi acceptance condition. See, e.g., [11, Chapter 1] for
more details.
Deﬁnition 4.4. Let Σ be a ﬁnite alphabet.A (ﬁnite, nondeterministic) automaton
is a tuple A = (Q, , q0, F ) where Q is a ﬁnite set, whose elements are called states,
q0 ∈ Q is a distinguished element called the initial state, F ⊆ Q is a set, whose
elements are called final states, and  ⊆ Q × Σ× Q is a ternary relation, called the
transition relation. For an inﬁnite word w ∈ Σ , a function  :  → Q is called a
run of A on w if (0) = q0 and, for any i ∈ , ((i), w(i), (i + 1)) ∈ . For any
word w ∈ Σ , the automaton A Bu¨chi-accepts w if, and only if, there exist a run 
of A on w and a ﬁnal state qf ∈ F such that the set {i ∈  | (i) = qf} is inﬁnite.
We next recall how valuations of variables naturally deﬁne inﬁnite words.
Deﬁnition 4.5. Let n ≥ 0 and Σ := P({1, . . . , n}). For any v ∈ P()n, we
deﬁne the inﬁnite word wv ∈ Σ by
wv(i) := v−1({u ∈ Σ | i ∈ u}) = {k | i ∈ v(k)}, i ∈ .
The following theorem, originally due to Bu¨chi [2], states that any S1S-formula
can be converted into an automaton.
Theorem 4.6. For any S1S-formula(P1, . . . , Pn), there exists an automatonA
on the finite alphabet Σ := P({1, . . . , n}) such that, for any v ∈ P()n,
v |=  if, and only if, A Bu¨chi-accepts wv, (3)
Proof. See, e.g., [11, Theorem 12.15] or [15, Theorem 5.9]. 
4.3. From automata to existential formulae. It is well-known that a Bu¨chi
automaton can be transformed into a formula of S1S which starts with a block
of existential monadic set quantiﬁers, but also has some quantiﬁcations over
individual variables after that. As we remarked in the introduction to the paper,
we require slightly more, namely that the quantiﬁcations over individual variables
are not needed in the signature L∗.
In order to state precisely the translation back from a Bu¨chi automaton to an
existential L∗-formula, we need to recall how inﬁnite words in Σ yield valuations
of Σ in P(), by the reverse process to Deﬁnition 4.5.
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Deﬁnition 4.7. Let Σ be a ﬁnite alphabet. For any w ∈ Σ , we deﬁne the
valuation vw : Σ→ P() by
vw(a) := w−1(a) = {i ∈  : w(i) = a}, a ∈ Σ.
Let A = (Q, , q0, F ) be an automaton on a ﬁnite alphabet Σ. We now deﬁne a
number of L∗-terms with variables from the setQ ∪Σ. First deﬁne the L∗-terms:
• Init := I ⇒ q0,
• Trans := ⋂q∈Q
(
q ⇒ ⋃(q,a,q′)∈(a ∩ Xq′)
)
,
• Part := ⋃q∈Q(q ∩⋂q′∈Q
q′ =q
−q′),
• Accept := ⋃q∈F ♦q,
and deﬁne the L∗-term tA by:
tA(a, q) := Part ∩ Init ∩ Trans ∩ Accept. (4)
Proposition 4.8. Let A be an automaton on a finite alphabet Σ. For any w ∈ Σ ,
A Bu¨chi-accepts w if, and only if, P(), vw |= ∃q (tA = 
). (5)
Proof. Clear from the deﬁnitions. 
4.4. Proof that T ∗ is model complete. Let ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) be a ﬁrst-order
L∗-formula. Let ϕ̂(P1, . . . , Pn) be the S1S-formula given by Proposition 4.3. Let
Aϕ̂ be the automaton on the alphabet Σ := P(1, . . . , n) = {a1, . . . , a2n} given
by Theorem 4.6. Let tAϕ̂ be the L∗-term deﬁned in (4). We deﬁne the existential
L∗-formula
ϕ′(p1, . . . , pn) := ∃a ∃q
⎛
⎝(tAϕ̂ = 
) ∧
2n∧
=1
⎛
⎝a = ⋂
k∈a
pk ∩
⋂
k ∈a
−pk
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠ .
Claim 2. T ∗  ϕ ↔ ϕ′.
Proof. It suﬃces to prove that P(), v |= ϕ if, and only if, P(), v |= ϕ′, for
any v ∈ P()n. Let v ∈ P()n be arbitrary. We obtain:
P(), v |= ϕ ⇐⇒ v |= ϕ̂ (by (1) in Proposition 4.3)
⇐⇒ Aϕ̂ accepts wv (by (3) in Theorem 4.6)
⇐⇒ P(), vwv |= ∃q (tAϕ̂ = 
) (by (5) in Proposition 4.8)
⇐⇒ P(), v |= ϕ′,
where the last equivalence follows from the fact that, for each a ∈ Σ = P(1, . . . , n),
we have
vwv (a) = {i ∈  : a = {k : i ∈ v(k)}} =
⋂
k∈a
v(k) ∩
⋂
k ∈a
−v(k). 
§5. Conclusions and future work. In this paper, we characterized monadic second
order logic on inﬁnite words as the model companion of the universal class of
(♦,X, I )-algebras. This is not a stand-alone result; we indicate a few of the possible
directions of further research here.
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First, we expect that it is possible to give a similar characterization of monadic
second order logic on ﬁnite words, by adjusting the axiomatization of (♦,X, I )-
algebras in the appropriate manner. A harder, but equally natural question, is
whether a version of our result holds for monadic second order logics on tree
structures, such as S2S, or ﬁnite trees.
Our result (and/or its incarnation for ﬁnite words) is likely to be related to the
duality theory for regular languages and logics that is being developed in a series of
papers including [6, 7]. It would be interesting to make these connections explicit,
in order to determine if the two approaches can beneﬁt from each other.
Riba [13] gives a model-theoretic proof of the completeness of Siefkes’ axioma-
tization of S1S. Our result in this paper entails that S1S, viewed as a ﬁrst-order
theory, coincides with the theory of the existentially closed (♦,X, I )-algebras
[16, Theorem B]. Therefore, we suggest that an alternative axiomatization of S1S,
and completeness proof for it, could be sought by axiomatizing existentially closed
(♦,X, I )-algebras. In a similar direction, we note that Gheerbrant and Ten Cate
[8] used modal logic techniques to axiomatize monadic second order logic on ﬁnite
trees, and fragments. An extension of our results in this paper to ﬁnite trees could
also be connected to the results in [8].
§6. Acknowledgement. We thank the referee for their valuable comments on an
earlier version of this paper.
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